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1.  Introduction 
Article 10(2)  of  Commission  Decision  No 3632/93/ECSC  of  28 December 1993 
establishing  Community  rules  for  State  aid  to  the  coal industry  stipulates  that  the 
Commission  is  to submit  to the  Council,  by  30 June 1997  at  the  latest,  a  report  on · 
experience  and  problems  in  applying  the  Decision  and  may  propose  any  appropriate 
amendments,  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  the  first  paragraph  of 
Article 95 of  the ECSC Treaty. 
This report starts by iooking back at developments in Commission policy on State aid to 
the coal industry since the 1960s.  It then turns to the situation today m the coal industry 
and on the coal market in the European Union and to economic and social trends in the 
individual coaJmining regions.  After analysing the financial position. of coal undertakings 
in the European Union,. the aid schemes and restructuring strategies, the report examines 
how far the objectives of the Decision have been attained  and highlights the practical 
problems encountered· and possible improvements in application of  the Decision.  It closes 
by looking ahead to the ·broader prospects, both in terms of  the general trends in energy 
policy and on the external front, in preparation for enlargement of  the Union. 
2.  ·Development of  Commission policy on State aid to the coal industry 
Since 1964 the Community has defined successive aid codes to keep the Member States' 
aid to the coal industry companl>le with the rules on aid and subsidies in the ECSC Treaty. 
ID. the process, since the 1960s the ECSC rules originally designed for two high-growth 
. strategic industries have had to be tailored to management of  an industry in decline, with 
dwindling prospects of  profitability.  This lasting crisis forced the Commission to consider 
the  oonditions  for  exemptions  from· Article 4(c)  of the  Treaty,  which  abolishes  and 
prohibits "subsidies or aids granted by States, or special charges imposed by States, in any 
form whatsoever". \  . 
The preamble to the first Decision on Community rules for State aid to the coal industry -
Decisiol!D. No 3/65/ECSC of 17 February 19651 - therefore stressed that in regions where 
there were l!D.Ot  yet sufficient development opportunities adaptation of  the undertakings to 
the new conditions on the coal market could carry with it the risk of  serious disturbance in 
economic 2l1ID.d  social conditions and that in order to avoid this risk it could be necessary to 
adjust  the  pace  of rationalisation  and  to  grant  aid  to· cover  the  resultant  costs  to 
undertakings. 
The objective of Decision No 3/65/ECSC was to adjust coal production to the market 
situation  and  the  measures  consisted  mainly  of aid  for  rationalisation  and  closure 
progrmmm.es to cover the resultant welfare costs. 
lBy  1970, when tllle Decision expired, the competitive and financial position of pits in the 
Col!Di111!1mnity  had hardly improved:  A  new  Decision was therefore adopted - Decision 
No 317UECSC.2  It gave a clearer definition ofthe strategy for the industry than the 1965 
Decision.  lF or  example~ Article 1 . of the 1971  Decision allows authorisation of aid to 
facilitate attainment of  the following objectives: 
"(  1) concentration of  production on the pits best able. to improve their productivity 
m1d best fitted to supply the Community with energy, having regard in particular to 
ilieir location m  relation to markets and to their reserves of the grades of coal in 
demand;  · 
(2) the continued adjustment of  production to the state of  the energy market, in so 
w as 1tllris does not lead to serious disturbances in economic and social conditions in 
regions where the development potential is as yet insufficient." 
.After ilie 1973/74 crisis on the world oil markets had shaken the Community's security of 
supplly,  the Commission, with the  unanimous  assent of the Council,  a~opted Decision 
No 528176/ECSC3 on 25lFebruary 1976 (backdated to 1 January 1976) to extend the aid 
to the coal industry.· 
Jay contrast to the earlier Decisions, the objective of  this third Decision was not only to 
soften the social impact of  the scaling-down of mining activity but also to stabilise coal 
production under satisfactory economic conditions.  The aim was to allow investments in 
more rational, profitable production.  Since these are long-term investment programmes, 
the Decision was valid for ten years. 
OJ No 31. 25.2.1965, p. 480. 
OJNoL 3, 5.1.1971, p.  7. 
3  OJ No L 63, 11.3.1976. 
-2-Coal production held steady between  1915  and  1982 but then fell  under the  combined 
impact of market forces (rebound from the oil crisis) and the Member States' desire to 
curb the constant increase in the aid required to keep much of  the European coal industry 
alive.  lin 1986, when Decision No 528/76/ECSC expired, it was clear that a new Decision 
on the rules for aid had to be adopted.  The time had come to retarget the objectives and 
return to the philosophy underlying the first two Decisions, ie. to adapt production under 
socially acceptable conditions. 
Against  thls  background,  in  June  1986  the  Commission  approved  Decision 
No 2064/86/ECSC.4  The  preamble  to  this  Decision 'stressed  the  need  for  further 
restructuring, modernisation and rationalisation of  the coal industry under regionally and 
socially  acceptable  conditions  to  make  this  branch  of industry  competitive  again. 
However, the Decision noted that the often unfavourable geological conditions made it 
unlikely that the Community's coal industry would become fully_ competitive again in the 
years ahead.  From then on, in order to obtain authorisation from_the Commission, aid to  .  . 
the coal industry had to help to achieve at least one of  the following objectives:  .  ·· 
improving  the  competitiveness· of tlie  coal industry,  which  cont.ributes  to  ensuring 
greater security of  supply; 
- creating new capacity provided it is economically viable; 
- solving the social and regional problems related to developments in the coal industry. 
A  Commission  assessment  of the  aid  granted  by Member  States to the  coal industry 
between 1987 and 1993 found tha! the objectives set in Decision No 2064/86/ECSC had 
only partly been attained.  Particularly intensive restructuring and  streamlining had been 
carried  out in  the  United  Kingdom,  fi·ance  and  Belgium,  where the aid  had  brought 
substantial  improvements  in  competitiveness  or made  it  possible  to  co11_1Plete"' closure 
programmes· under  regionally  and  socially  acceptable  conditions.  Against  this,  the 
indicators for the Spanish and German coal industries over the same period showed that 
aid granted automatically on the basis of  the quantities produced encouraged investments 
in maintaining production capacity offering no long-term guarantee of  economic viability.  .  . 
In response to these mixed results, the Commission was forced ·to consider tightening up 
the rules on aid, particularly in the light ofthe general upward trend in aid -_incompatible 
with the transitional,  exceptional nature  of the  scheme  - and  of the fact  that  despite 
continued  restructuring,  modernisation  and  rationalisation  of the  industry,  a  large 
proportion of coal  production in the Community was still uncompetitive against imports 
from non-Community countries and would remam so, given the differences in costs. 
4  OJNoL 177, 1.7.1986, p. 2. 
- 3-With  Decision No 3632/93/.IECSC5  of 28 December 1993  the  Commission  sought  to 
create a framework for coal policy valid until the JECSC Treaty expires in July 2002 and 
tailored  to  the  new  energy  economics.  The  first  two  objectives  of 
Decision No 2064/86/ECSC lin particular had lost much of  their raison d'etre in thls new 
context.  As the world coal market was stable, vvith abundant supplies from a wide variety 
of g~graphlcal somces,  the  security  of supply  argument  was  no  longer  sufficient 
justification  for  mam1tammg  unprofitable  capacity.  Also,  the  unfavourable  geological 
conditions v»rttum]ly preCluded creating new economically viable capacity.  Consequently, 
Decision  No 3632/93/.IEC§C  provides  only  for  residua!  operating  aid  conditional  on 
malking  further  progress  towards  economic  viability  in  the  light  of coal  prices  on 
mtemationan markets, with the aim of  degression of  aid.  However, this should imply that 
the mines  or undertakilmgs  receiving  this aid  must have hope of achieving  a  degree of 
competitiveness  with  imported  coal  in  the  long  term.  Henceforth,  the  two  main 
justifications for  aid  are to solve the  social and regional problems created by total or 
partial reductions m  ilie activity of  production units and to help the coal industry adjust to 
environmental protection standards.  Another innovation in Decision No 3632/93/.IECSC is 
ilie ttmspall'fmCY reqmremmt.  Article 2 clearly states that once the three-year transitional 
period expnres, only aid entered in Member States' public budgets or channelled through 
strictly  equirvalen.t  mechmnisms  will be authorised.  lin  particular,  this  implies  that the 
amooots received nmst be indicated properly in. the undertakings' accounts. 
The objective of  degiression of  aid implies cutting costs and/or capacity.  The efforts to cut 
production costs must form part of  a restructuring, rationalisation and modernisation plan 
for ilie mdustry,  dn11wmg  a distinction between production units considered capable of 
attmmmmg  ilie  cost-cutting  target  and  which,  therefore,  could  aspire  to  a  degree  of 
competitivelill.ess in the long term and units which will not be able to, in which c8lse a plan 
must be produced to scale do'INn their activities and close them down by 2002 (when the 
IEC§C  Treaty ad the  current  rules  on  aid  expire).  Exceptional  social  and  regional 
problems could be the oruy reasons for postponmg closure beyond that date. 
3.  Coal industiy and market in the European Union 
Since the new framework Decision  entered into  force  at  the  start  of 1994,  the  basic 
parameters for the coal market in the European Union, particularly the factors influencing 
conSumption, have deteriorated further.  Throughout the period from 1992 (the reference 
ye.!llr for Decision No 3632/93/ECSC) to 1996, despite the increased demand for energy, 
solid fuels lost further market share to other sources, particularly oil products and,  above 
all, ·natural gas.  This illustrates how the coal market is affected by developments on the 
energy market.  Despite very low coal prices, the low prices also charged for alternative 
sources,  together  with  the  first  moves  to  deregulate  the  electricity  market  and  the 
mounting  environmental pressures,  preve~ted any increase  in  solid ·fuels'  share  of the 
energy market in most Member States. 
5  OJ No L 329, 30.12.1993, p.  12. 
-4-3. I  Production 
from over 184:million tonnes in 1992,  coa~ production in the Community fell to around 
128 million tonnes in  1996.  The sharpest contraction was in the United Kingdom, where 
production was down from  84 million tonnes in 1992  to just over 50 'million tonnes in 
1996.  By comparison,  over the same period production fell  from 72 million tonnes to 
53 million tonnes in Germany and from 9.5 million tonnes to 7.3 million toilnes in France 
but held relatively steady in_  Spain on 17. 8 million tonnes,  against  18.6 million tonnes in 
1992.  In two countries - Belgium and Portugal - coal production has ceased completely. 
Consequently,  the fastest restructuring was in the  Unitea Kingdom which  concentrated 
·production solely at profitable pits in preparation for the privatisation of  the British Coal 
Corporation. 
· Deregulation of  the UK electricity market in turn has given power station operators free 
access to primary energy sources.  This has unleashed fierce competition from natural gas 
which has eroded the market share taken by coal and, for want of  other outlets for coal, 
triggered a 'Sharp reduction in production.  Although the far-reaching restructuring and the 
/ productivity  improvements  obtained  after  privatisation  have  enabled  British  coal  to 
recapture part of  the UK market from imported coal, nevertheless it is still not genuinely 
competitive against coal imported from outside the Community. 
Table 1 
Coal produdion (in '000 tonnes) 
%change 
1986  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1996/92 
B  5625  218  0  0  0  0  -100 
D  87126  72153  64175  57623  58858  53105  -26 
E  15895  18551  18402  18194  17627  17800  -4 
F  14394  9478  8576  7538  7014  7335  -23 
p  212  221  197  . 147  0  0  -100 
UK  104635  83987  67463  48971  52630  50160  -40 
Others  95  149  15  1  0  0  -100 
EUR15.  227982  184757  158828  132474  136129  . 128400  -31 
EUR12  227970  184720  158824  -. 132474  136129  128400  -30 
- 5-3.2  Consumption 
futrm-Community deliveries of coal  feU  from 315 million tonnes in  1992 to 270 million 
tonnes in  1996.  This trend in  total deliveries  is largely  attributable  to the electricity 
industry,  the  le8Jding  consumer.  Over  68%  of coal  deliveries  today  are  for  power 
generation.  Coking plants now take just 19%.  The remaining 13% are for industry and 
domestic  heating.  Including  deliveries  in  finland,  Sweden  and  Austria  in  1992, · 
intra-Comvmmity deliveries therefore fell by over 20% or 70 million tonnes in six years. 
Table 2 
JI:ntra-Community deliveries of coal (in mill.non li:onnes) 
Wow  en- Coking plants  lindustcy  IIDomesltnc  <Olltlhters 
stations* 
Jl990  203.259  67.823  34.292  11.484  2.644 
91l  214.550  64.858  35.957  13.419  2.767 
92  205.673  60.196  34.935  11.175  2.797 
93  180.883  52.869  32.794  9.9'48  2.458 
9.:8  163.332  50:571  31.554  9.488  2.185 
1l995  194.543  52.402  31.961  6.856  2.677 
96  184.026  50.191  29.822  6.642  1.695 
c.  Public sector power stations and coal mine power: stations. 
Including the new German Liinderfrom 1991 and EUR 15 from 1995. 
Coal provides 21% of  the energy consumed for electricity generation out of 50% by all 
fossiUhels.  Generally,  coal's share of gross intra-Community energy consumption fell 
from 16.1% in 1992 to 13.5% in 1996. 
Niche markets, particularly for anthracite, with different price structures from the rest of 
the coal market will also have to be monitored more closely by tlie Commission, given the 
small n'lllllnber of  producers in the Community, to avoid potential distortion of  competition. 
3.3  Imports and world market in solid fuels 
lincludl.ing  lFfulland,  §we~en and  Austria,  imports from non-lEU  countries also  fell,  from 
147  ~o  138  million  tonnes.  This  partly  dashed  the. leading  non-EU  producers' 
expectations that lower production in the Community would be matc~ed by an equivalent 
increase m  imports.  The leading non-EU suppliers of  coal, based on the 1996 estimates, 
are,  m  dlecreasing  order,  tlle  USA (37.9  million  tonnes},  South Africa  (27.1  million 
tonmes}, Australia (17.1 million tonnes), Polmnd (17.1 miiHon tonnes} and Colombia (12.8 
miilion  tomriT.es).  While  ilie  competitiveness  of ilie  D§A  m:aci  Au&Jralia  remams 
'!.~m.challengecil m  view of  ~Jrc~IDr  ext;remelly  fuvow~Me geoRogi.c~! COllll1li.:ti:1:D1li§,  whlclbt  allow 
opei!H~&Slt  ll!IJiin:ml.g  b  mrur.y  places,  nevertllleRess.,  .  m  ~fume,  hlglbte1r  s~fety  st!Um.d£rltfts  m 
u.mciergJrOUJctcl mmes  ~z:o1 lint~mvememts m  workm.g COllll.Wtions coup1e:rll wWm me ~ely  w21ge 
~:re:mds C(: ~d  llm.dlerE:D.e  tt;:; compet]tiveness of a numbe:r of oilier  cmErn1tries,  whlch re1y 
-6-more  on  the  ready  availability  o( a  large  workforce  than  on  favourable  geological 
c9nditions.  Although these countries'. policies exert only a marginal influence on world 
market coal prices, the steady introduction of  minimum safety stalidards will nevertheless 
call for new mining equipment and safety facilities. 
There is  also  a growing  risk that  coal imported from non-EU countries could replace 
Community coal on certain segments of  the market, not only for price reasons but also on 
quality  and  environmental  grounds  (very  low  sulphur  content  in  coal  from  certain 
countries). 
Finally,  as  regards  security  of supply, · coal  is  a  very  reliable  fuel  available  from  an 
extren:tely wide range of  geographical and geopolitical sources, with producing countries 
in every continent.  This diversity of supply ~las brought great stability to the market and 
prices (see Table 3) even at times of crisis.  It must be remembered that this objective 
situation lies at ~e  very core of DeCision  No 3632/93/ECSC: one of  the recitals states 
that as a result of  the abundant supplies from a wide varietY of  geographical sources "even 
in the long term and with mcreased demand for coal the risk of  persistent interruption of 
supply ... is ... minimal". 
Table3 
Imports of  coal from non-EC countries 
1986  1992  .  1993  1994  1995  1996  %change 
1996/92 
B  6792  13147  11404  12087  13671  '10520  -20 
DK  11065  11789  10319  11544  12975  13600  15 
D  9401  14248  12627  13896  13891  15300  7 
GR  1756  2132  1337  1500  1409  1409  -34 
E  8688  13729  12293  11395 .  13595  11575  -16 
F  13877  21401  13900  11914  12790  14920  -30 
IRL  2025  2737  2690  2243  2243  2572  -6 
I  18990  17557  14287  1588S  18481  17990  2 
L  157  253  251  207  107  97  -62 
NL  11550  14661  14871  16746  17021  16500  13 
A  3687  - 3796  3178  2580  2995  2995  -21 
p  1477  4445  4762  4990  5981  5150  16 
FIN  0  4232  5932  7862  5711  . 6300  49 
s  4352  3001  3189  3024  3459  3177  .  6 
UK  9759  19817  18078  14570  15612  15700  -21 
EUR15  103576  146945  129118  130447  139941  137805  -6 
EUR12  95537  135916  116819  116981  127776  125333  -8 
- 7-TabHe 4 
JPrice trends ifor  co~ll nmp01rts from non-lElU coamtbries 
Cokiillllg co~n *  §te~m  coan 
nllll lU§$/tt  lEV wenghtl:ed avenge  IExdnarrnge 
ra~e 
Year  Max.  JEl[J  average  Mnllll.  fin U§$/tce  nD:lllECUnrJ  IEC!I.J/IU§$ 
1990  59.80  54.14  48.89  44.i9  54.26  1458 
1991  59.20  55.27  47.25  42.78  52.01  1441 
1992  57.30  52.98  46.62  40.85  51.77  1362 
1993  55.00  47.69  40.00  31.51  44.81  1304 
1994  54.30  45.13  38.62.  29.98  43.71  1254 
1995  58.40  55.04  44.88  32.95  50.53  1319 
1996  57.50  46.81  42.79  39.53  48.64  1290 
"for tM fourth quarter of each Y""'"· 
4.  Economic and social situation in coalmining regions in the European Union 
Article  2  of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and  Steel  Community {ECSC) 
states that  "the  Community  shall  progressively  bring  about  conditions  which  will  of 
themselves ensure the most rational distribution ofproduction at the highest possible level 
of productivity,  while  safeguarding  continuity of employment  and  taking  care  not  to 
provoke fundamental  and persistent diSturbances in  the· economies of Member  States". 
Over the years, social concerns have gradually become the decisive factor in  Community 
coal policy.  Article 2 was written for an industry growing on a Community market but 
gradually the social welfare provisions in the Treaty have had to be tailored to manage the 
crisis in a sector in decline and severely tested by competitors worldwide. 
The Community has therefore fine tuned the tools for managing the social impact of the 
crisis,  giving priority to an  adjustment  and  conversion policy.  The  instruments in  the 
ECSC  Treaty  (particularly  Articles  54  and  56)  have  been  joined  by  the  EC  Treaty 
provisions on the Structural Funds.  The Commission has carefully targeted aid from these 
various instruments on the regions hardest hit, most recently by deciding on 15 June 1994, 
six  months  after adoption of the new  rules  on  State  aid,  to  extend  the  RECHAR II 
Community initiative.  6  The Commission stressed that it took this decision because many 
coal-mining areas are amongst the areas of  the Community which have been or are likely 
to be hardest hit  by problems of industrial restructuring,  and because they have special 
difficulties in  adjusting rapidly to changing economic circumstances.  It  added that this 
Community initiative would give priority to improving the environment, to promoting new 
economic activities and to developing human resources. 
6  OJ No C 180, 1.7.1994, p.  26. 
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1.27 
1.23 
1.30 
1.17 
1.19 
1.31 
1.29 
-
--Table 5 
RECHAR D fundinu(1994-1997) 
Country  Programme  Funding from Structural Funds  Total project.value 
(in ECU million at 1994 prices) 
D  Brandenburg  30.250  49.322 
D  Niedersachsen  1.650  3.300 
D  Nordrhein-Westfalen  66.448  280.412 
D  Saarland  6.260  22.861 
D  Sachsen  29.800  53.630 
D  Sachsen-Anhalt  19.220  30.603 
D  Thiiringen  5.000  10.000 
A  Rechar  1.800  7.036 
B  Hainaut  0.930  1.860 
B  Limburg  14.750  56.190 
E·  Rechar  33.630  55.969 
F  Bourgogne  1.520  3.080 
. F  Languedoc-Roussillon  1.000  2.738 . 
p·  Lorraine  10.790  25.109 
F  Midi-Pynmees  1.130  4.440 
F  Provence-Cote d' Azur  1.000  2.024 
F  Rhone- AJpes  1.000  2.024 
F  Nord-Pas-de-Calais  16.680  39.318 
GR  Rechar  . 1.500  2.025 
I  Sardegna  0.770  1.560 
I  Toscan~  0.890  32.573 
p  Rechar  0.860  1.147 
UK  East Midlands  41.640  99.278 
UK  Eastern  Scotland  9.880  21.888 
UK  Wales 
; 
20.210  46:443 
UK  West Midlands  12.510  27.858 
UK  Western Scotland  3.000  6.501 
UK  North East  England  23.170  51.153 
UK  North West  6.820  ·15.281 
UK  Yorkshire  44.030  96.191 
Total  408.138  1051.814 
-9-This· extra effort from the Structural Funds has been backed up by greater use ofthe social 
welfare  allowances to help  workers to adapt provided  for  by Article  56  of the ECSC 
Treaty.  For  example,  on . 13  April  1994  the  Commission  adopted  social  measures  in 
connection with the restructuring of the coal industry. 7  In its information  note cin  this 
subject, the Commission stressed that the Community has clear responsibilities under the 
ECSC Treaty and may,  consequently, have recourse to specific instruments to promote 
readaptation and intensuy the associated measures in order to attenuate the consequences 
of  restructuring fo:r workers and to share the cost. As regards the type of  social measures 
to apply, the Commission noted that,_ as a result ofthe change in the structure ofthe coal 
industry workforce and, in particular, the decline in the number of  older workers in recent 
year~, there will be fewer opportunities for early retirement while other measures, notably 
redeployment, will have to be more widely employed!. The Commission also took account 
of certain  countries'  pmctice  of protecting  incomes  by granting  a  flat-rate  severance 
premium. As a result, between 1994 and 1996 the following additional aid was granted to 
workers from the lEuropean Union coal industry: 
1994  199§  1996 
Sen:neficiamies  Gnn:n~  Beneli'icianliel!l  Gran:nts  lEeneficianries 
Belgium  525  1.622.998  324  1.216.000  484 
Germany  4.000  12.879.241  3.907  15.628.000  3.340 
Spain  4.344  5.709.654  2.376  8.107.695  864 
France  2.610  6.825.998  503  1.790.000  1.150 
Portugal  212  637.844  16  64.000  2 
United Kingdom  13.809  24.043.909  850  1.870.000  270 
I 
Total  25.500  51.719.644  7.976  28.675.695  6.110 
7  OJ No C 108, 16.4.1994, p. 3., 
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Gnllmis 
1.346.000 
. 13.360.000 
3.246.000 
4.600.000 
8.000 
594.000 
23.154.000 4.1  Gennany 
In  what is now the main coal producing country in the European Union, the coal industry-is in 
effect  concentrated in  two fields,  the Ruhr and the Saar.  Production is  centred on  19 pits, 
employing a total of  over 90 000 workers, including 55 000 underground (provisional figures 
for 1996). Compared with certain other countries in the Union, the rate of  job losses has been 
relatively  low in  recent  years  and has scarcely  exceeded 8% a  year.  Given  the extremely 
diverse economic fabric of the regions concemed - the fruit of the vohmtary retraining policy 
pursued for many years - jpb losses in the coal indUstry have so far had no significant effect_ on 
the unemployment rate. 
Commission Decision 94/1 070/ECSC11  authorising the first modernisation, rationalisation and 
restructuring plan for the coal industry submitted by the German authorities under Decision 
No 3632/93/ECSC took account of the need to minimise the social and regional  impact of 
restructuring, considering that the mines in question cou1d not be made competitive at all in the 
future.  Since the economic position of  the German pits concerned has not improved and this is 
a  social  and  regional  problem,  Germany's  initial_ plan  has  merely  put  off economically 
inevitable decisions and will mean even faster job losses under socially acceptable conditions in 
the years ahead. 
4.2  spairl 
The Spanish coal industry has been restructuring since 1990. The 1990-93 plan cut production 
by 7% to 18.1  million tonnes in 1993 compared with 19.4 million tonnes in 1990 and reduced 
the workforce by 33% (to 28 140 workers in  1993 from 42 000 in 1990).  These COI)trasting 
trends can be explained by the fact that the reduction in  the least competitive underground 
production  has  been  offset  by  increases  in  far  less  labour-intensive~  appreciably  more 
competitive open~t  production. 
The Spanish authorities asked to notify the Commission of their national plan to restructure~ 
rationalise, modernise and reduce the activity of the coal industry in two phases: a first phase, 
covering the period 1994 to  1997  and approved by Commission  Decision 94/1 072/ECSC,9 
with the  ·objective of reducing undergrOl.md production' by around 12% and the workforce by 
27% compared with 1993, to be followed by a second phase for 1998 to 2002 based on the 
lessons drawn from the first phase. 
8 
9 
OJ No L 38S, 31.12.1994, p.  18. 
OJ No L 38S, 31.12.1994, p. 31. 
- 11-Coalmining is  spread over a  number of fields  Asturias  (Central  and  Western  field),  Loon 
(Bierzo-Villablino. Sabero and North), Palencia (Guardo and Barruelo), Catalonia (Pirenaica), 
Teruel (Teruel-Mequinenza) and South (Puertallano and Peilarolla). 
AroWld a hWldred Wldertakings·, mostly private with the exception of the public Wldertakings 
HUNOSA~  Minas de Figaredo, Endesa and Encas'ur, share production. Only four Wldertakings 
produce more than one million tonnes a year and  13. more than  200 000 tonnes.  Some 12.7 
million  tonnes  come  from  undergrmmd  workings  and  5.4  million  tonnes  from  open-cast 
mining. As in Gennany, all coal mined in Spain is produced at a loss. 
The  notification  from  the  Spanish  Government  stated  that  61  out  of a  total  of 96  coal 
tmdertakings collld be expected to make progress towards improving their economic viability 
in the light of coal prices on international markets, as provided for by Article 3 of Decision No 
3632/93/ECSC, by reducing production costs.  At the same time, l;lowever, closure plans had 
been. drawn up. for 35 Wldertakings, _including the public Wlderground workings, as provided 
for by Article 4 of the same Decision. Although some of these will not fmally close tmtil  after 
23  July 2002, the-phase-out plan will nevertheless lead to a significant reduction in activity 
before then. 
The coal regions in Spain are highly dependent on mining. Some are in isolated areas, adding to 
the need to back up  the restructuring with  regional  conversion  measures to create new and 
economically sound activities  capable of reabsorbing the redundant workers into productive 
employment,  ac;  provided for  by  Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty.  But  despite the  RECIIAR 
schemes,  reindustrialisation  is  at  a  standstill  in  most  Spanish  coalfields,  pushing  the 
Wlernployment rate above the national average. 
The  measures  taken  to implement  the  first  ( 1994-97)  phase  of the  restructuring  deviated 
considerably from the plan.  The Spanish Government has armowtced that it intends to notify 
the Commission of  a new plan for 1998 to 2002 taking account of  this deviation in the past and 
. in line with the general and specific objectives of Decision No 3632/93/ECSC.  This plan will 
be backed up  by measures to reactivate the economy and to soften the social and regional 
impact of  the restructuring. 
4.3  France 
In  France, coalmini.ng  is  now concentrated on  the Lorraine and Centre-Midi coalfields.  The 
producer, Charbonnages de France,  is  a  public sector undertaking.  The process of reducing 
production capacity has been tmder way for many years, mrunly due to unfavourable geological 
conditions. In  the process, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais field  was closed completely in  1990 and 
over 20 000 jobs were lost between 1986 and 1996. 
- 12-The activity-reduction plan submitted by the French authorities in  accordance with  Decision 
No 3632/93/ECSC  was  authorised  by  Commission  Decision  95/465/ECSC1°.  Prior  to 
finalisation  of this· plan,. the French  authorities  consulted the two  sides  of the industry  to 
produce a common vision of the French coal industry's future culminating in the signing of a 
National Coal Pact between Charbonnages de France and the trade union organisations. 
This Pact provides for progressively ending coalmining by 2005.  The acute social and 
regional problems made it impossible for the French authorities to keep to the deadline of 
2002  set in  Decision No 3632/93/E.CSC  for the closure plan.  Staggering the  closures 
over a ten-year period should help to reduce the particularly sensitive social and regional 
problems in regions which for years have been affected by the reduction in  activity in the 
coal industry and will enable a maximum number of workers to benefit from measures 
based on age'by the year 2000. 
As the  activity-reduction  plan  is  put  into  action,  the  underground  mines  at  Forbach. 
(Lorraine coalfield)  and  La Mure (Dauphine,  Centre-Midi coalfield) and the open-cast 
mine at Carmeaux are scheduled to close tlris year.  · 
4.4  Portugal 
Portugal  has  three  coalfields,  of which  recently  only  the  Douro  field  has  been 
economically viable.  The Carbonifera do Douro (ECD) company. concentrated over 95% 
of  production in the region in the Germunde ·pit and one small open-cast mine.  Since the 
late 1980s the company-has suffered mounting operating losses which have been covered 
by State aid.  These are due mainly to geological conditions, depletion of  resources, poor  -
coal  quality  and  difficulties  in  disposing  of output.  After Electricidade  de  Portugal, 
virtually the only client, decided to convert the nearby power station to natural gas at the 
start of  199  5, there was no  longer any outlet for the coal produced. 
In  response,  the Portuguese  Government  therefore  submitted  to  the  Commission,  on 
5 August 1994,  an  activity-reduction  plan,  as  required  by  ·Article 8  of 
Decision No 3632/93/ECSC.  This provided, m  particular,  for  complete closure of the 
'Germunde  mine  on  31 December 1994.  This  plan  was  approved  by  Commission 
· Decision 94/994/ECSC11  and d!Jly put into action.  Since 1995 coal is no longer mined in 
PortugaL  The closures led to the loss of650 jobs between 1992 and 1996. 
IO  OJ NoL 267, 9.11.1995, p. 46. 
11  OJNoL379,31.12.1994,p. 3. 
- l3-4.5  United Kmgdom 
!Betwem  !991  and  1994  the  British  Coal  Corporation  carried  through  its  final 
restrucruring  and  rmtionalisation  programme  to  tailor  its  production  capacity  to  the 
oontillllrung oontracaiolll of  ilie market and to world market prices. 
As  required  by  Article 8  of Decision  No 3632/93/EC§C,  in  March 1994  the  United 
Kingdom Govemmoot notified the Commission of  the modernisation, rationalisation and 
restructuring plan for the coal industry which was subsequently approved by Commission 
Decision 94/574/JEC§C. 12  The  priority  was  to  make  the  UK  coal  industry  fully 
ool!ltliJ!lleiliive  'Wiili  coal prices on international markets and to privatise !British Coal.  To 
achleve lthls objective, the industry had to step up the restructuring and--close many mines. 
Moo m  Much 1994 the United Kingdom Parliament adopted the Act on the privatisation 
of !Bridm  Coml  and the  establishment  of an  independent  body,  the "Coal Authority", 
respollll.Sll'ble,  mmongst  other things,  for  issuing  operating  licences  under  a  transparent, 
l!JlOn-~atory  scheme  guaranteeing  fair  competition  between  all  coalmining 
wndmmmg~.  Privatisation was oompleied by 31 December 1994.  Consequently, since 
the  stm  of the  1995-96  fuumcial  year,  the  United Kingdom  coal  industry  consists 
ex:cllmsively  of private  undertakings  which  receive  none  of the  aid  provided  for  by 
Articles 3, 4, 6 and 7 of  Decision No 3632/93/JEC§C. 
Most  of ilie  former  !British  Coal mines  which  remained  open  after  the  restructuring 
process (a total of  19 mines) were taken over by RIB Mining.  Concessions for six others 
were bought or leased by Coal l!nvestments JPlLC.  In Scotland and Wales, one mine was 
trmsferretll to :Mf.inmg  §ooilimd and four were taken over by the workers: Hatfield Coal, 
!Betws Anthracite, 'JI'ower and Monktonhall (which was recently declared bamkrupt). 
§mce ilim Coal linvesaments has been declared bankrupt.  'JI'wo  of  its mines have closed 
and tlrree have beoo bought up by staff.  The other was auctioned off.  R.ffi Mining has 
also closed down one mine. 
The generally positive picture with restructuring and privatisation in the United Kingdom 
must nevertheless be put into perspective.  Although the industry's production costs are 
. now very close to world market prices, this is no guarantee of  economic survival.  lfn 
particular, untill998 the UK coal industry will continue to benefit from supply contracts 
with electricity producers, which buy coal at above world market prices.  Consequently, 
not until these  contracts  expire  will  it be possible  to  have  a  clear  idea  of the  real 
competitiveness of  the privatised UK coal in~ustry. 
12  OJNoL220,25.8.1994,p.l2. 
- 14-Question marks also remain about the production costs of  the privatised pits and the real 
workforce, since the private undertakings receive no aid and, consequently, are under no 
obligation to submit these data.  · 
.Beyond  ·1998  there is  also  a  danger that the prospects for UK coal,  produced mallily 
underground, could be clouded by the high sulphur content and the cost and necessity of 
installing  desulphurisation  equipment,  which  would  further  erode  its  competitiveness 
against natural gas: 
In addition, until 2002 at least the heavy social costs of  restructuring will continue to be 
borne by the State budget, as.inherited liabilities, as provided for by Article 5 of  Decision 
No 363.2/93/ECSC.  Approximately 24 000 underground workers lost their jobs between 
. 1992 and 1996.  Although the accompanying social welfare measures under Article 56 of 
the ECSC Treaty have been generally satisfactory (with British mines preferring severance 
grants), the results have been more mixed on retraining for jobs outside the industry and 
·creating ahemativej:Ohs_under the auspices of  the British Coal Enterprise.  An impressive 
number of  alternative jobs have been created (officially over 127 000 between 1985 and 
1995).  However, many former miners have had to accept sharp wage cuts in order to find 
new employment. 
In a  related  development,  the  situation  remains  critical  in  certain  coalmining  regions, 
where the unemployment rate is often above the national average, which, however, is well 
below the level in most European Union countries. 
Table 7 
Underground staff employed at the end of  the year (in thousands) 
%  change 
1986  1992  ;  1993  1994  1995  1996  1996/92 
B  13.3  0.8  0.3  0  0  0  -100 
D  107.1  78.3  71.8  64.7  . 58.4  55.3  -29 
E  37.4  30  25  23.7  21.6  21.3  -29 
F  18.5  7.5  7  6.4  .  6.1  .  5.3  -29 
IRL  0.3  0.3  0  0  0  0  -100 
p  0.8  0.5  0  0  0  0  -100 
.UK  108.4 
'  36  . 21  9.1  .11.5  11:8  -67 
EUR15  285.8  153.4  125.1  103.9  97.6  93.7  -39 
- 15-Table 8 
Production costs (in ECU/tce) 
0/o change 
1986  1992  1993  i994  1995  1996  1996/92 
B  132 
D  125  143  151  154  159  155 
:E  130  147  131  127  133  116 
lF  - 117  100  110  125  134  129 
p  101  121  112  107 
UK  93  71  62  52  43  41 
EU  112  114  119  110  104 
5.  Financial position of coal undertakings in the European Union.  aid  schemes and 
restructuring strategies  · 
How can compliance with Article 4 of  the EC§C Treaty, written for a strongly growing 
industry, be  reconciled with social and regional management of  .an  industry in  decline? 
Although ilie underlying  problem of loss  of competitiveness is  the  same  for  all  coal 
undertakings in the European Union, the strategies adopted by Member States to solve it 
vary widely.  in general terms, three different strategies can be identified. 
5  .l  Germany and Spain 
These two countries have decided to -maintain the operating aid for current production 
provided for by Articles  3  and  4  of Decision  No 3632/93/ECSC.  This  is  intended 
primarily to cover undertakings'  operating losses.  Since the the end of the three-year 
transition period allowed by Article  2  of the Decision,  such aid  must  be funded  from 
public budgets instead of the special non-budgetary levy mechanisms previously used to 
fund the coal industry. 
lin  this  context,  at  the  end  of  1994 ·the  Gel1llan  Constitutional  Court  ruled  the 
''Kohlepfennig" levy anti-constitutional and prohibited it as from 31 December 1995.  The 
Court reached its judgment on the following  grounds:  by choosing to raise  finances 
through  a  special  contribution,  the  legislators  had  departed  from ·three  fundamental 
principles  of financial  organisation.  lin  making  these  fiscal  rules,  they had  assumed 
legislative  ~owers  beyond  the  scope  of  financial  organiSation;  in  view  of the 
non-budgetary namre of the proceeds of the special contribution,  they had called  into 
question the budgetary powers of  ilie Parliament;  they had undermined the principle of 
equality in ';axation by shifting the charge to the taxpKyer  from  the fiscal  burden to a 
special chaif,:e.  §mce, in the light  of the  Court judgmrot, the aid  aliil'an.gements  were 
ammded before tllle  end of  ilie transition period pmvided for m  Artcle 9(7) of  Decision 
No 3632/93/ECSC, i.e. befme 3ll0Jecember 1996, thls made no diffeJrooce to &]!:Jpmval of 
the aid notified by C':rrermany. 
- 16-Between 1992 and  1996 operating aid totalling over JECU 23  billion was granted to the 
Ge1rman coal industry, with ·no significant degression observed over the period. 
However,  for  years German  coal undertakings, notably Ruhrkohle  and  Saarberg, bave 
. been  conducting  policies,  some  more  successful  than  others,  to  diversifY  into 
profitamaking non-mining activities as a first step towards realigning the undertakings. 
Spain will bring its aid for current production into line with Decision No 3632/93/ECSC, 
i.e.  enter  it in  State  budgets,  with  effect  from  1 January  1998.  For  1997,  it  sent 
notific~tion of a mechanism which it  considered strictly equivalent.  However, to avoid 
any  problem with  the transparency of this  aid,  after  discussion  with  the  Commission 
departments concerned it was finally decided to enter the aid in the State budget. 
During 'the transition period, aid to the Spanish coal industry was, therefore,  still funded 
mainly  by  means  of a  levy  on  electricity  prices  charged  to  consumers  by  OFICO 
(Electricity Compensation Office):  The Commission approved aid granted to the Spanish 
· coal industry under this scheme in  1994,  1995  and 1996.  For 1997,  Spain published the 
rate of  the levy on electricity prices (  4. 864%) in an addendum to the State budget'. 
Between 1992 and  1996  operating aid  totalling  over .ECU 3 billion was granted to the 
Spanish  coal  industry.  No  degression  was  observed  and  the  undertakings'  financial 
position deteriorated further over this period. 
This suggests that progress with Spain's modernisation, rationalisation, restructuring and 
activity-reduction  plan  has  been  unsatiSfactory.  In  February 1996  the  Spanish 
Government signed programme contracts with the largest undertakings receiving the aid 
referred to in Article 4 - HUNOSA, Minas de Figaredo SA and Mina  la  Camocha SA -
committing  it  to  pay more  aid  than  provided  for  in the  restructuring  plan  originally 
submitted.  The Commission  asked for  further  details of the aid envisaged under these 
programme contracts.  The Commission considered the replies inadequate and finally,  on 
23  April 1997,  sent  the  Spanish  Government  a  letter  of formal  notice  to  submit  the 
information requested and propose appropriate measures to correct the deviation from the 
original plan. 
The  other Spanish  coal undertakings  seem to offer no  guarantee of implementing  the 
restructuring measures to improve their  economic viability  and  thus justifYing  the  aid 
which  they receive,  particularly  under  Article 3.  On  23  April  1997  the  Commission 
therefore wrote to ask the Spanish authorities. for explanations about progress with the 
modernisation,  rationalisation  and  restructuring  plan  plus  any  corrective .  measures 
proposed. 
.  - 17-5.2  France and Portugal 
Coal undertakings in these two countries were in a very similar position;  First, geological 
conditions  were  relatively  unfavourable,  with  small  depleted  reserves  and  prohibitive 
costs, as in Germany and Spain, plus, finally,  a national energy policy shifting away from 
using coal  as a  fuel.  As a  result,  the authorities and  coal undertakings in  both these 
countries  are  resolutely  pursuing  an  activity-reduction  strategy  aiming  at  ending 
coalmining completely in the long term. 
As regards management of State aid, both countries have kept to the letter and spirit of 
Decision  No 3632/93/ECSC.  France  granted  operating  aid  totalling  ECU 818  million 
between 1992 and 1996, with clear degression (from JECU 187 million in 1992 to less than 
ECU 87 million  in  1996).  The  same  trend was observed ·in  Portugal,  naturally  on a 
smaller  scale,  with  operating  aid  totalling  ECU 14 million  after  declining  from 
JECU 5.8 million in 1992 to ECU 1.8 million in  1994, the last year of coalmining in that 
country. 
5.3  United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is the only country in the European Union today close to operating a 
compefuirve  coal industry.  Aid  linked to current production between  1992  and  1996 
totalled just JECU 22 million; a very modest amount compared with the volume produced. 
However, leaving aside the social snd regional problems outlined earlier, it is relatively 
diffi.Cllili to demonstrate any intrinsic long-term economic viability in the UK coal industry, 
~  the exception of a  few openDcast  mines.  [t must not be forgotten that the most 
modem installations m  tthe  United Kingdom, where the privatised undertakings are now 
brealking  the productivity records,  are the fiuit  not  only  of highly  efficient,  rigorous 
xrummgemelll!t but also of  a pro-active investment programme by the public authorities via 
ilie  JRmish  Coal  Corporation  in  the  1970s,  the  most  striking  example  being  the 
developmelllt of  the Selby coalfield.  lin  other words, the privatised coal undertakings in 
the United Kingdom are benefiting from a situation created partly by public aid in the past. 
A close watch will have to be kept to see whether they in tum make the heavy investments 
whlch are the only way of  securing the long-term future of  the industry. 
6.  Attainment of  the objectives of  the Decision 
6.1  Definition of  aid 
One of the principal  improvements made  by the new framework,  compared  with  the 
earlier Decisions,  ns  the exhaustive definition  of aid.  llndirect  aid  is  often particularly 
difficult to keep track of  ll:t takes the form of  measures by the authorities which have no 
impact  on the budget but nevertheless give coal undertakilllgs  an  economic advantage. 
Exemptions from environmental standards are one example.  Another are loms granted to 
coal mderta!rings by publlic  Oll' semi-public bodies whlch the mdertakmgs could not have 
obtwed umdlei normal market economy conditii(])ImS. 
- 18-6.2  Transparency 
The other area where major progress has been made is with the requirement for greater 
transparency in  the form  of clear budgeting  Qf all  aid,  after a tranSition  period.  This 
provision has caused a number of  problems, particularly in Germany and Spain, because it 
implies ending aid schemes based on levies paid by electricity consumers and entering all 
aid  in public  budgets  or strictly  equivalent  mechanisms.  This  objective  has  now been 
attained in Germany (with the abolition ofthe Kohlepfennig), providing a true picture of· 
the vohiine of aid granted to the coal industry there.  Spain was unable to make sitiillar 
changes to the OF!  CO arrangements by the end of the transition period but should do  so 
in  1998 at the latest.  Regrettably, no breakdown of aid in  Germany between Articles 3 
and  4 is available,  for  lack of detailed  infoimation  on production  costs per pit.  This 
uncleamess will have to be rectified from 1997 on to enable the Commission to perform 
its monitoring task. 
6.3  Degression 
By contrast, no significant progress has been made towards economic viability and, hence, 
degression of aid.  However,  given  the fundamental  energy economics  and  geological 
data, it would be illusory to imagine that this objective could be attained.  Member States 
will therefore have to be urged to, make a realistic appraisal of  the situation with the result 
that  a  steadily  growing  proportion of the  aid  linked 'to  current  production  should  be 
authorised under Article 4 of  the Decision, i.e. as aid for the reduction of  activity. 
6.4  Social and environmental objectives 
Although the principal  economic objective of the new. aid  code has not  been  attained, 
fortunately the two  other "subsidiary" objectives· have,  namely  to solve  the· social  and 
regional problems and to adjust to new environmental protection standards.  Clearly with 
no prospects of  economic viability for the industry in France and Germany and at the vast 
majority of  the pits in  Spain and some in the United Kingdom, the Member States have 
opted primarily for social and regional choices taking account of  a series of  parameters. 
6. 5- -Evaluation of  aid authorised 
The policy mapped out by Decision No 3632/93/ECSC has certainly made it possible to 
keep  the  situation  under  control  in  an  extremely  difficult  context.  Without  a  strict 
framework for aid, there was a risk that, on the pretext of  safeguarding security of supply 
- which,  as seen,  was by  no  means  at  risk  - the  Member  States  would  embark  on 
investment  programmes  to  modernise  the  coal  industry  without  any  real  prospect  of 
economic  viability.  Such  investments  were  indeed  made  in  the past,  particularly- in 
Germany and Spain. 
- 19-It must be hoped that situations like this will no longer be repeated in the future since they 
do not make for optimum allocation of  national budget resources. 
The new, framework kept the volume Df aid authorised relatively stable throughout the 
period  1990~96, probably ~en allowing a  slight degression in real tenns, allowing for 
inflation.  However, it is also clear that despite the reduction in production the amount of 
aid per tonne has increased.  This is due; in particular, to the fact that the closures have 
not necessarily been at the mines with the highest production costs.  In other words, in 
certam countries and regions unprofitable capacity, in some cases with production costs 
five times world market rates, has been kept in operation, mainly for social reasons, while 
in oiliel!"s, particularly the United Kingdom, application of strictly economic criteria closed 
mines whlch were much closer to profitability.  this unsatisfactory result is due to the lack 
of  a genuine Community approach to restructuring. 
At the same time one objective difficulty with evaluating the amount of aid must also be 
recognised.  The world market coal prices used to determine the level of aid are not a . 
fixed  indicator.  More specifically,  steam coal prices,  expressed in US dollars,  rose by 
12% between 4/1993  and 3/1996 (from US$43 to US$48 per tee), while coking coal 
prices rose by 5% over the same period (from US$55 per tonne to US$57.6 per tonne). 
Since the US dollar 4epreciated against the ECU by around 8.5% over the same period, 
world market coking coal prices in ECU fell  slightly,  whereas steam coal prices rose 
slightly.  Consequently, the impact of the exchange rate for the dollar is by no means 
negligible. 
Another factor which has influenced the level of  aid reported is the steady reduction in the 
''lreference price" required by Decision No 3632/93/IECSC which specifies that the amount 
of  aid is detemmied from "the selling price freely agreed between the contracting parties 
in the light of  ahe  conditions prevailing on the world market".  This has been artificially 
hlgh, particularly in §pain, pushing up the level of  aid actually reported. 
finally, . it must  also  be remembered  that Article 9(7) of Decision  No 3632/93/IECSC 
allows Member States a grace period dUring the first three years of  application of  the new 
rules -to  bring their arrangements into line  With  the Decision.  This therefore makes it 
difficult  to assess the effectiveness  of the  Commission's policy  from trends over this 
period. 
Strict application of  the principles laid down in the Decision from 1997 onwards should 
end this uncertainty. 
-20-Table 9 
Aid authorised 1992-1996 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Germany 
4497.7  -linked to current production*  4462.6  ***4845.8  4784.2  5370.2 
- not linked to current production **  246.7  256.3  181.4  106.7  104.7 
Spain 
- linked to current production "'  463.3  373.3  73o:8  731.9  730.8 
'  -not linked to current production"'"'  108.9  0.0  145.3  135.0  148.7 
'France 
- linked to current production *  186.9  190.2  298.0  56.9  87.6 
- not linked to current production "'"'  77_4.6  818.1  614.8  612.3  592.3 
Portugal 
- linked to current production *  5.8  6.4  1.8  0.0  0.0 
- not linked to current pr<><l;uction **  0.0  1.0  3.6  0.9  0.9 
United Kingdom 
- linked to current production "'  0.0  1.9  20.1  0.0  0.0 
- not linked to current production *"'  13.1  12.4  870.0  1622.8  494.0 
EUTOTAL 
- linked to current production "'  5153'.7  5034.4  5896.6  5572.9  6188.7 
-not linked to current production **  - 1145.0  1087.8  1815.0  2477.7  1340.6 
Aid linked to current production 
in ECU/tonoe  28.1  -31.7  44.7  41.17  .48.20 
*·  Aid granted under Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Decision No 2064/86/ECSC and under Articles 3 and 4 of 
Decision No 3632/93/ECSC. 
**·  Inherited liabilities under Decision No 2064/86/ECSC and aid granted under Articles 5,  6 and 7 of 
Decision No 3632193/ECSC. 
Disregarding  the  activation  of DM 5 350 million (ECU 2 779  million)  from  a  credit  line  t~ cover. 
compensation fund debts in the context of the German Law of 19 July 1994 guaranteeing coal supplies 
for power stations. 
- 21  -7.  Application ofthe Decision 
7.1  Practical problems and possible improvements 
Application  of  the  new  rules  on  aid  is  governed  by  Commission  Decision 
No 341/94/ECSC13 of  8 February 1994 implementing Decision. No 3632/93/ECSC.  This 
aims at obtaining comparable communications from the Member States so that the data on 
the  financial  position  of the  undertakings,  particularly  their  productio:Q  costs,  can  be 
checked and the Commission cim monitor conditions of  supply to the principal consumers 
in  the  Community,  by  placing  an  obligation  on  coal  and,  where  appropriate,  steel 
undertakings in the Community to submit information to the Commission on coal and 
coke supplies in the Community. 
In practice the implementing Decision has had only limited effect since the undertakings · 
have not always used the speCified forms in the spirit of  the Decision.  This is particularly 
true of  form A on production costs, where some undertakings have included aid in their 
sales revenue. 
Also, for technical and practical reasons aggregate totals rather than individual deliveries 
have  been  reported  for  coking  coal  deliveries  to  the  steel  mdustry  and  steam  coal 
deliveries to power stations.  Computerisation should allow closer monitoring, minimise 
bureaucracy and safeguard the imperative confidentiality. 
On recent trends, no changes in the framework Decision seem necessary between now and 
2002.  On the contrary, the Decision should provide the impetus required to change the 
direction of  coal policy m all coal-producing countries. 
On  ilie  oilier hand,  the framework  Decision will have to be applied  more· rigorously, 
partic'!llady to rule out any possibility of  deviation of  the aid.  To achieve this, the rules in 
the funrnplementing  Decision will have to be applied even more vigorously to allow more 
systenuntic monitoring. 
lFiruilly, apart from the purely technical difficulties, one crucial problem vvith application of 
the  l!D.ew  framework  Decision  is  that  the  undertakings  and  the  Member  States' 
Governments  do  not  always  realise  clearly  enough  that  the  exemptions  allowed  by 
Amcle 4(c) of  tthe  EC§C Treaty by no means imply exeroption from the other rules on 
competition in the Treaty.  On the contrary, the preamble to the Decision recalls that '1n 
order to ~erform  its task ilie Community must ensure the establishment, maintenance and 
observance  of  normal  ·competitive  conditions"  and  that  'm  the  light  of  the 
abovementioned provisions, State aid must cause no distortion of competition and must 
not discriminate between coal producers, purchasers or consumers in the Community." 
13  OJ No L 49, 19.2.1994, p.  1.. 
-22-7.2  Complaints and d.i§putes 
In a letter dated 2nd August 199714  the Commission informed the German Government 
that it had decided to institute the procedure provided for  by Article 88  of the ECSC 
Treaty in· response to-two compl8ints lodged through the Office of  the United Kingdom 
Pemnment  Representative  alleging  that  German  companies  were  selling  coal  on  the 
Community market with  irregular  ~tate aid  from the  German  Government  authorised 
under Decision No 3632/93/ECSC (Cases 96/4724 and 96/4752).  · 
These  complaints  concerned  the  sale  of German  anthracite  on  the  European,  and 
particularly UK. market at prices well below the production costs  ..  The sales covered by 
the complamt seemed to have been made at a loss with the help of  the aid granted to coal 
producers  by  the  German  Government.  The  extremely  competitive  prices  were 
compensated  for  by  direct  or indirect  use  of State  aid  received  from  the  German 
Government to cover operating losses under Decision No 3632/93/ECSC.  According to 
the plaintifl:  these IJractices  distorted competition on the European anthracite market. 
The plaintiff also pointed out that the same  companie~ sold the same product at higher 
prices in other Member States. 
The Commission sent the German Government a letter of formal notice requesting the 
information needed so that, .without prejudice to its final poSition, it could check whether 
the conditions laid  down in  Decision No 3632/93/ECSC ·and the. Community rules ·on 
competition had been met. 
· The  letter · also  indicated  the  measures  which  could  be  taken  should  the  German 
companies' practices be confirmed. 
In addition, on 23 April 1997 the European Commission sent the Spanish Government a 
letter of formal  notice  requesting information on changes made  to the  objectives  and 
criteria in the activity-reduction plans and on the State aid under the contract programmes 
with HUNOSA,  Minas  de  Figaredo  and Mina  de  Ia  Camocha  SA.  In this  letter the 
Commission requested  Spain to provide information  on  any  deviation  from  the plans  · 
· which it had approved for 1994-97 and to propose the necessary corrective measures. 
The Commission published this letter in the Official Joumal15 to give the other Meritber 
States and interested. parties noiice to submit their comments.  After receiving the reply 
from the Spanish· Government and the comments from the third parties concerned, it is 
now up to the Commission to take a, decision.  · 
14  OJ No C 258, 23.8.1997, p. 2. 
15  OJNoC137,3.5.1997,p.6. 
-23-8.  Political proSJ)ects 
8.1  General trends in energy policy 
The Commission White Paper on "An energy policy for the European Union"16 identified 
three objectives as being most relevant to the energy sector: 
- overall competitiveness; 
- security of  energy Slipply; 
- environmental protection. 
Although coal has clear advantages for the first  two of these objectives, this does not 
necessarily count in favour of  Community coal and the third point raises certain problems, 
for both Comnmnity and imported coal alike. 
This notwithstanding, the philosophy in the White Paper confirms the general direction of 
the coal policy enshrined in  Decision No 3632/93/ECSC.  It  states that for  economic 
operators to have full  confidence in the internal energy market and to be ensured .that 
market principles prevaiL it will be essential that there is a maximum of  transparency and 
consistency in applying the competition provisions of  the Treaties.  It adds that a phased 
reduction and transparency of State· aid to the coal industry is needed, with the aim of 
ensuring that  ·m ·the medium ter:ttl Community coal production costs decrease. 
8.2  The environment 
At its meetfug on the environment on 19 June 1997, the Council adopted conclusions on 
Community strategy on climate change.  Conclusion 10  envisages further initiatives to · 
contn"bute to meeting the emission-reduction objectives.  The various options mentioned 
by the Council include progressive reductionlremoval.of fossil fuels and other subsidies, 
tax schemes and regulations which counteract energy efficiency, in particular by including 
climate change considerations in the 1997 review ofthe guidelines for State aid to the coal 
industry. 
16  COM(95) 682 final. 
-24-These conclusions force  the  Commission  to rethink  its  strategy on  solid  fuels  and,  in 
particular, to assess their imPact on the environment and climate change.  To this end, the 
Commission will soon be submitting a communication on the future of  solid fuels.  Clearly 
the crux of the question is use of rather than production of solid fuels in the European 
Union,  considering that,  as mentioned earlier, the sharp  reduction in production in the 
Commuirity·has been accompanied by stabilisation of  imports which now account for over 
half ()f solid  fuel  consumption  in  the EU,  at  a  time when  use -of coal worldwide  is 
expanding. 
8.3  Enlargement_ 
The Central and Eastern European energy market is dominated heavily by solid fuels.  The 
situation of  the coal industry in these countries must therefore be examined as part of  the 
pre-accession process.  This applies in particular to Poland, the leading coal producer in 
Europe with over  135 million  tonnes in  1996,  of which around  18 million  tonnes was 
exported  to  the  European  Union,  and  also  holds  true,  to  a  lesser  extent,  for  the 
Czech Republic. 
The  Europe  Agreement  concluded  between  the  European  Communities  and  their 
_  Member States and the Republic  of Poland,  as  approved by  Council and  Commission . 
Decision 93/743/lEuratom,  ECSC,  EC  of 13 December 1993,17  entered  into· force  on 
1 February 1994'.  It includes  a  ptotocol on ECSC products (Protocol2), Article 8  of 
which  stipulates  that  public  aid  in  any  form  whatsoever  except  derogations  allowed 
pursuant ·to  the  ECSC  Treaty  is  incompatible  with  the  proper  functioning  of the 
Agreement, insofar as it may affect trade between the Community and Poland.  it adds 
· that any practices contrary to this 'Article will be assessed on the basis of criteria arising 
from the application of  the rules of  Articles 65  and 66 of  the ECSC Treaty, Article 85  of 
the EEC Treaty and the rules on State aids,  including ·secondary legislation.  The rules 
necessary for implementation of  the procedure for assessing State aid must be adopted by 
the Association Council by the end of  a transition period of  three years from the entry into 
force of  the Agreement, i.e. this year.  ' 
Consequently, provided the preliminary work is completed soon, next year Poland can be 
expected to make-its State aid to the coal industry more transparent; in accordance with 
Decision No 3632/93/ECSC,. and to agree a notification and monitoring mechanism with_ 
the Commission. 
17  OJ No L 348, 31.12.1993, p.  1. 
-25-9.  Main conclusions 
Decision No 3632/93/ECSC provides an adequate framework to back up the adjustments 
which  have  become  inevitable  in  the  European  Union  coal  industry  for  want  of any 
medium- to  long-term  prospects  of economic  viability  for  the  vast  majority  of the 
industry. 
The new framework has raised awareness of  the real level of  aid in each coal-producing 
country and prompted the Governments and undertakings to shift the emphasis of their 
strategies increasingly towards activity reduction. 
The practical diffipulties which have emerged here and there are not signs of  imprecision 
or ineffectiveness of  the rules in the Decision and the implementing Decision but of  lack of 
rigorous application by certain Member States, combined, in some cases, with a degree of 
negligence with regard to the competition rules in the Treaty. 
The new rules take the sectoral objectives in the ECSC Treaty as the starting point but 
place the coal industry in the general context of energy policy,  as defined in the White 
Paper, thus opening up prospects beyond the year 2002. 
Decision No 3632/93/ECSC  also  provides  a  firm foundation  for  bringing  the rules  on 
·state  aid  in  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  closer  into  line  with  the 
Community rules, in preparation for enlargement.  ' 
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